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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ANITA FLIPPEN,
Plaintiff and AplJ!ellant, ·

. vs.

C-ase No. 7551

FAY MILLWARD,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts
set forth in appellant's brief, but is of the opinion th_at
a few additional facts, not set forth therein, would be
helpful. They relate to: (1) a more detailed description of the ,place of the accident as indicated by plaintiff's Exhibit ''A'', prepared by a witness, Franklin
Charles Nielsen (R. 33), (2) the position of the automobiles at the time of the collision, (3) in regard to
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Millward observing the Flippen 'automobile before the
impact and (4) the conversation with Mr. Flippen as
to whether the tail-light on his automobile was working.
The point marked 16, Exhibit "A", is . the north
edge of the bridge or culvert (R. 35). The s:pace
between 10 and 11, marked on Exhibit "A", is a
12-foot dirt shoulder (R. 36). This shoulder. is a good
solid shoulder and capable of being driven on with~
out any danger (R. 38). The distance from the north
· edge of the bridge, number 16, to the double line at
the center of the highway is something over 35 feet
(R. 39).
George E. Briggs testified he noticed glass on the
pavement a little north of the intersection in the center
of pavement -a little west of the yellow line (R. 105).
Mr. Millward testified that at the time of the
collision his left wheel was approximately 6 or 8
inches from the center or yellow line. This was true
after the impact (R. 111). His car stopped within
probably a car length from the ~oint of impact and
the Flippen car was in a straight line ahead of hiih
(R. 112). He further testified that he came to an
immediate stop -at the time of the collision; that he
did not know whether he had applied his brakes just
bef·ore or at the time, but that he did stop immediately. (R. 42).
In connection with his conversation with Mr.
Flippen, about two weeks after the accident, Millward
testified that Flippen did state that possibly the t·ail-
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light didn't work (R. 115). Mr. Flippen, in relation
to this conversation, stated that he was referring to
the stop light and told him so at the time, that is,
the light that goes on when you step on the brakes;
that it pos-sibly didn't work (R. 119). Mr. Flippen also
testified that the spare tire on his car was carried completely underneath the. back of the truck (R. 86).

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON

1. THERE IS EVIDENCE To SuPPORT INSTRUCTION No. 7.
2. INSTRUCTION No. 7 IS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
ARGUMENT
1. THERE rs EVIDENCE To SUPPORT INsTRUCTION No. 7.

The entire argument of appellant is based ~tpon
the statement that there was no eviden·ce of any sudden slowing down of the plaintiff's automobile. In
making this statement, it is apparent to respondent
that appellant has failed to take into consideration
not only some of the oral testimony shown in the
record and set forth in her brief, but has completely
ignored the physical facts disclosed by the ~vidence.
It is true that Mrs. Flippen testified that she was
traveling around 8 to 10 miles per hour at the time
of the im,•pact. This testimony, however, is in direct
conflict with the testimony of three witnesses who testified that appellant's car came to rest 12 to 15 feet
s,traight ahead of respondent's car. Mr. Ross Everett
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Williams testified that after the ~collision plaintiff's
·car was squarely in front of defendant's car down
the highway about 10 or 12 feet (R. 94), and that
they h·ad to push the truck off the road (R. 93). The
witness, Floyd Dean Buckley, testified that after the
collision the plaintiff's car was 12 or 14 feet in front
of defendant's; that the defendant's car was directly
behind plaintiff's (R. 101). And the respondent, Millward, testified th~at after the impact he walked over
to the Flippen vehicle, which was 12 or 15 feet straight
ahead of his car on the highway (R. 112). This
physical fact ,could hardly have hap:pened, if Mrs.
Flippen had been traveling 8 to 10 miles an hour, as
she so testified, and then been struck in the rear by
a car going at approximately the same speed. This
is evidence that the car had ·been slowed down to
-almost 'a stop or, in fact, had. stopp·ed upon the highway. There is the further testimony of Mr. Millward:

''Q Now, can you describe the blow when
you hit as .to whether you hit something like
it was solid, still, or something moving~
"A It was very solid. * * * '' (R. 113).
In addition to these statements of a physical fact,
we have the testimony of Mrs. Fliwen herself that,
as a precaution, so she would not hit the ditch, she
put the ear in second gear just before the impact
(R. 74, 75). This in and of itself would ·cause the car
to reduce its speed considerably.
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These facts, together 'vith the damage done to
defendant's automobile, as shown by Exhibit "1",
and the fact that the spare tire of the appellant,
which was carried entirely underneath the truck, was
embedded in the radiator grill of" defendant's car,
clearly demonstrate that appellant mus.t have either
suddenly slowed down or, in fact, stopped her automobile upon the highway.

In many cases, physical facts are far more reliable than oral testimony. As stated in Moore on Facts,
Weight· of Evidence, Volume 1, the following examples
are g1ven:
''Section 155. Physical Facts in Case of Collision Between Vessels. - Given the position of
a slowly moving schooner on the starboard of
a steamer; given the facts that a half-laden
steamer, readily and quickly obedient to her
wheel, moving ten miles an hour, puts her helm
hard down, and coming around strikes · the
schooner with her port side-on these premises
the conclusion was held to be irresistible that
this steamer was in very close proximity to
the schooner when she put her helm hard down;
and this stubborn physical fact cannot be overcome by testimony on the part of the vessel
that she put her helm hard a-port several minutes before the collision.''
''Section 156. Stories of Violent Collision
Without Physical Evidence Thereof. -· * * * It
is 'simply incredible, against all common human
experience, against all ,physical facts, that the
end of a shaft attached to a buggy, drawn by
a horse going at a full brisk trot, should
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strike a woman in the left side with force sufficient to throw her on ~a granite-paved street,
and , with for~ce sufficient . . . to cause her
death, and yet not leave on the body the slightest sign of violence. Such testimony should be
disregarded by both courts and juries, and ne
probative force should be given to it.' In a
case where an electric car, going several miles
per hour on a down grade, collided with a
wagon, and the car stopped substantially at
the point of the collision ~thout the persons
on the car being materially disturbed or the
car showing any evidetice of the occurrence
other than a £ew scratches in the p-aint, and
without the wagon being thrown forward upon
the track or broken or marred at the place of
contact, the court said that 'such circumstances
so outweigh any amount of testimony, from
the lips of witnesses, that the car was going
many miles per hour :at or about the instant
of the eollision, as to leave no room for such
testimony to be true. ' ''
From the physical facts, it could be properly inferred
that appellant suddenly stopped or slowed down on
the highway in front of the oncoming traffic, thus
supporting Instruction No. 7.

2.

INSTRUCTION No.

7

IS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

Counsel for appellant points out at page 21 of
his brief that it is not error to give an erroneous
instruction if an examination of all the evidence establishes that the one complaining of the error would
not be entitled to prevail in any event. Had the
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court instructed the jury as requested by the defendant, and viewing all of the evidence, the court would
not have given its Instruction No. 3 and, particularly,
the folloWing 'Portion thereof:
"I instruct you th·at driving into a motor
vehicle on the highway before you see it is
negligence as a matter of law, and in this case
the defendant; Fay Millward, is guilty of negligence which would preclude his recovery on his
counterclaim and would entitle Anita. Flippen
to recover her damages against him * * *. ' '
Taking into consideration the climatic conditio.ns
at the time of this accident, we contend that the case
falls entirely within the rule laid. down ·in the case
of Trim·ble et ux. v. Union Pacific Stag-es et al., 105
Utah 457, 142 Pac. (2d) 674, wherein the court stated:
"Appellant argues that since defendant's bus
was moving at such a speed after entering the
fog that it could not be stopped within the
driver's range of vision, the driver, and his
principals, the defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Thus in effect appellants ask this court to say that one driving
on a highway at night is bound to anticipate
that there will be fog, smoke, or some other
obstruction which will reduce the driver's
vision, and that therefore all must drive at
such S'peed that should they meet with such an
obstruction they •can stop their automobile within the range of their vision as it is limited by
this obstruction. We do not believe this to be
the correct rule of law, or the situation to
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which the rule laid down in the Dalley case,
supra, was intended to apply.''
The court refused Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 8, reading as follows:
''You are instructed that the driver of a
vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall
both approach for a right turn and a right
turn shall be made as close as practical to the
right hand ·curve or edge of the roadway and,
if you find from- the evidence in this case that
plaintiff f~ailed to so do and that her failure to
get as close as practical to the right hand
edge of the roadway was the proximate cause
of or contributed to her injuries and damage
claimed, your verdict shall be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff no cause
of action. ''
Had the court given proper instructions, then,
under the evidence, the jury very well could have
found that the defendant was not negligent. The jury
could have further found that the plaintiff was negligent in not approaching for the right turn as close
as pr·actical to the 'right hand curve or edge of the
roadway. This is true, particularly, when we take
into consideration the nature of the highway, the
density of the fog and the knowledge that plaintiff
had of her course. She had been over the road n1any
times, said that she could see thirty feet or more to
the right and knew that there was travel coming dovvn
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the high,vay in the dense fog.

We think that any

reasonably prudent person would have driven the
vehicle clear to the right and even used the shoulder,
which was solid and good to travel on.
The jury could have further found Mrs. Flippen
negligent in not having the tail-light on, though she
claimed she had it on. The defendant said he never
saw one, the men in the ear behind him never saw
one and,- according to defendant's testimony, Mrs.
Flippen told the defendant she had turned off her
lights because she could see better in the fog without
them. As heretofore pointed out, ~here is ample evidence that the jury ·could find that appellant had either
slowed down considerably or stopped on said highway.
There is no question that she did not give a_ signal
and Mr. Flippen testified that he thought his stop
lights, which flash on and off when you p·ut on your
brakes, were not working.
The jury could not have been misled .by Instruction No. 7. They were instructed that they must find
by a preponderance of the· evidence that ~laintiff
suddenly decreased her speed without giving a proper
signal. If there is no evidence to support this, why
should the conclusion be drawn by counsel that the
jury found that this happened merely because of the
giving of the instruction~ If the court finds that there
was no evidence to support this point, the error would
not be reversible error, as indicated by the case of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Shafer v. ·Keeley Ice Cream Go., 65 Utah 46, 234 Pac.
300, wherein the court, at page 304, stated_:
''Error is assigned because of the giving by
the court of instructions numbered 12 and 13.
'' The effect of instruction No. 12 is that the
law places upon pedestrians, who leave the sidewalk .and enter upon that portion of a street
commonly used and intended for vehicles, the
duty of con~inuous observation and care to
protect themselves from injury. · The court had
submitted to the jury the question whether
plaintiff had suffer~d injury to the face or
eye, by being hit with a piece of candy. thrown
froin defendant's float, concerning which there
had been some testimony. It is no doubt true
that instruction No.· 12 was intended to have
some bearing upon this particular question.
Otherwise we · are unable to find any testimony
in the record that called for that instruction
or any like instruction. In any event, the giving
of it did not constitute prejudicial error.''

Kuchenrneister v. Los Angeles ·& S. L. R. Co., 52
Utah 116, 172 Pac. 725. In this ·case it is insisted that
the court i!lcluded an element of damages in its charge
with respect to which there was no evidence. The
court held:
"W;hile it is true, as a general rule, that it
constitutes error to submit to a jury questions
of fact or issues upon which there is no evidence, yet it does not always follow that prejudice results from an erroneous charge of that
~character. Where, as here, there is no claim nor
evidence respecting plain tiff's earnings, it will
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not be assumed that, in view of the ehatge of
the court that the jury must be governed by the
evidence, they did allow anything for past earnings. This question was before the Supreme
Court of Indiana in the case of Ohio & M. Ry.
Co. ~. Stein, 140 Ind. 61, 39 N. E. 246, :and in
Lytton v. Baird; 95 Ind. 349; in which cases it
was held that ·such ~a charge, under the circumstances outlined above, cannot be held to ·be
prejudicial.''
The case of Kelly v. Employers Casualty 'Co.,
(Okla.), 214 Pac. (2d) 925, cited by plaintiff, is diff_erent in every respect from the case :at bar. In that
case there was an allegation oi contributory negligence, the defense did not put on any evidence and
plaintiff did not testify whether or not she did signal
to slow down, while in the. case :at bar I>laintiff testified that she gave a signal to turn, not one to slow
down or stop ; in fact, she claims she never did slow
down or stop, and from -such circumstances the jury
could have come to the conclusion that she did not
signal to slow down or stop. In the Oklahoma case,
the court also held that the eourt gave an erroneous
instruction concerning agency. This was due to the
fact that agency was admitted by the pleadings of
defendant, which were not verified.
CONCLUSION
The appellant contends that there is no evidenee
which would justify the giving of Instruction No. 7,
and that the giving of the same was prejudicial error.
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Taking the evidence as a whole, there is ample to
'SUpport the ~ving of Instruction No. 7. In fact, the
evidence would. have· justified the coiUrt in finding appellant guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
·of law. Therefore, we respectfully .submit that appellant was not, in any event, prejudiced br the glving
of Instruction No. 7, and that the verdict of the jury
and judgment thereon should be :affirmed.
Respectfully. submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON,
Attorneys for Defendant
·and Respondent.
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